The US should stand firm in the Arctic, as Russia lays claim to own the North Pole

The UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) last month released a 63-page document, which states that Russia has received approving recommendations for most of its claims to seabed rights in the central Arctic Ocean. This is approximately 1.7 million square kilometers of seabed, and the area claimed includes the North Pole. Russia claims ownership of the area on the basis that it is an extension of its continental shelf, as allowed for under international law.

The CLCS approval doesn’t mean that Russia now has uncontested ownership of the North Pole seabed: other arctic nations also have pending continental-shelf bids in. The North Pole is also claimed by Denmark (through its ownership of Greenland) and Canada, and other areas of the Russian claim are, or will be, contested by the USA (based on Alaska) and Norway. If these claims are also approved by the CLCS, the various nations would be expected to settle the borders by negotiation. The mere fact that Russia planted a titanium Russian flag on the North Pole seabed in 2007 would carry no weight: the likeliest future owner of the Pole, based on maritime legal precedent, would be Denmark as Greenland is the nearest land to it.

Negotiations with Russia, as and when they come, need to be conducted from a position of strength. To that end, the United States, in concert with its Nato allies, has launched Operation Ice Camp 2024, a clear signal of the West’s determination to maintain a strategic foothold in the Arctic Circle. The latest iteration of the long-standing exercise is not as it has always been; no, this time, it represents a significant recalibration of Nato’s posture towards Russia’s growing ambitions in the High North.

Gone are the days when Operation Ice Camp was merely a photoshoot to show off a US or British nuclear submarine surfacing through the ice. Now rebranded and expanded, Operation Ice Camp 2024 represents the sharpened tip of Nato’s spear in the Arctic; it shows that the alliance is taking the threat of Russian militarisation seriously.

This operation draws forces from across the alliance – Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States – and it functions now as a declaration of unity and resolve in the face of bleak elements and perhaps even more inhospitable rivals. Conducted primarily in the Beaufort Sea, the allied effort is aimed at training Nato forces to deal with the Arctic’s unique challenges, such as its unpredictable acoustics, diverse sea life, variable salinity, formidable ice keels, and its requirement for specialised knowledge and capabilities for navigation, communication, and manoeuvring.

The operation’s activities, including submarine transits, operations at Ice Camp Whale, under-ice exercises, and operations in the North Pole’s high latitude regions (referred to as “POLEX” by the US Navy), are instrumental in enhancing Nato’s readiness for high-stakes environments. These exercises ensure that Nato forces are able to operate an assertive presence in the region.

The Nato nuclear submarine fleet, particularly the US one, outmatches the opposing Northern Fleet of the Russian navy. But in other respects the balance of power tips in the opposite direction.

Russia operates 40-plus Arctic-capable icebreaker ships, seven of them nuclear powered and thus capable of ploughing through very thick ice. Canada has 17, though none are nuclear and only two are heavy icebreakers. The US has only two, and they are old and in poor condition. Norway has two, and Denmark none. Britain has a single naval icebreaker, HMS Protector, but she spends more time in Antarctic waters than in the High North. Russia’s northern coast is the most populated shore of the Arctic – though it is still only sparsely inhabited – and sees the most activity.

It had been thought that the Arctic ice retreat might mean much more shipping through the Arctic by now, particularly along the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast. This is a much shorter route from the Far East to Europe than the usual voyage via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. However the route is only open for a few months in the summer, and only a dozen or so ships typically use it each year: the predicted massive increase has yet to materialise.

Likewise it is thought that large reserves of oil, gas and minerals lie beneath the Arctic, which would make the division of seabed rights important, but for now and probably for a long time it will mostly be uneconomic to exploit them. 

Nonetheless, Russia is clearly determined to seize as much of the Arctic as it can. The fracture between the West and Russia, deepened by the war in Ukraine, has resulted in a surge in military, diplomatic, and intelligence activities in the Arctic. This new ‘Great Game’ has Nato and its old adversary jockeying for control over strategic assets and influence in the region.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to Nato underscores the shift in how the region is viewed, with every Arctic nation now aligned with the United States against Russia.

It is in this context that the Arctic has become a symbol of resolve; it is a testament to the alliance’s commitment to safeguard its interests and ensure peace through strength in the face of creeping, dictatorial regimes. As the geopolitical and, indeed, physical tides shift, the Arctic is no longer a remote, hypothetical frontier. It is literally heating up.